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insufficient research and a tendency to
conflate fleet exercises with strategic
planning.
Nonetheless, and while the background
material that makes up a significant por-
tion of this study is not always reliable, the
book is of value to the specialist for the
fresh perspective it offers on the Royal
Navy’s response to the operational chal-
lenges of the interwar period.
CHRISTOPHER BELL
Naval War College
Chisholm, Donald. Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes:
Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy’s Officer
Personnel System, 1793–1941. Palo Alto, Calif.:
Stanford Univ. Press, 2001. 883pp. $125
Donald Chisholm has provided us with
an important book. It is the first compre-
hensive history of the development of the
U.S. Navy’s officer personnel system.
Others have provided portions of the pic-
ture; Christopher McKee’s A Gentlemanly
and Honorable Profession: The Creation of
the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794–1815 is
an excellent treatment of the early years.
But the Royal Navy, from which many
American practices derive, is more thor-
oughly covered. Extensive coverage of the
Royal Navy is to be found in Michael
Lewis’s British Ships and British Seamen
(1940); The Navy of Britain: A Historical
Portrait (1948); A Social History of the
Navy, 1793–1815 (1960); and The Navy
in Transition, 1814–1864: A Social History
(1965). William Laird Clowe’s magiste-
rial seven-volume The Royal Navy: A His-
tory from the Earliest Times to the Present
(1897), although dated, remains impres-
sive. Yet no one has provided for the U.S.
Navy books of such depth and coverage
until now, with Chisholm’s impressive
work.
Chisholm’s intent goes well beyond a his-
torical recounting of events. His stated
aim is “to explore how institutions are
created and elaborated, to assess the use-
fulness of the problem-solving concep-
tion of decision for so doing, and to
relate the previously untold story of the
origins and development of the U.S.
Navy’s officer personnel system.” Chis-
holm believes that the problems faced by
the Navy’s officer personnel system par-
allel in many ways those faced by other
large-scale organizations. He is at least as
interested in process as he is in outcome,
and he draws with impressive scholarship
upon multiple disciplines, including not
only history but political science, sociol-
ogy, strategic management, foreign pol-
icy, and public administration. Although
Chisholm’s vehicle is the detailed study
of naval officer personnel management,
he uses that as a means of studying orga-
nizational management in a broader con-
text. In this he is successful. Extensively
researched in primary sources and thor-
oughly documented, his book is a major
contribution to organizational theory.
The author’s intended audience is the
community of naval officers—past, pres-
ent, and future—congressional scholars,
and students of American political devel-
opment. However, an even wider audi-
ence will appreciate this study for its
insights into institutional problem solv-
ing, modification, and growth. However,
even a comprehensive study such as this
must set its limits. To make things man-
ageable, Chisholm chose to omit the staff
corps and Marine Corps, the development
of the reserves, the creation and modifica-
tions of the Naval Academy curriculum,
and the enlisted personnel system.
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It took almost 150 years to construct the
naval personnel system that existed at the
beginning of World War II. Chisholm
makes clear that this system did not
come about because of any grand design
but as the result of an infinite series of
incremental decisions made to solve
problems as they arose. The three main
motivations behind these decisions were,
Chisholm argues, efficiency, equity, and
economy. “Efficiency” in this sense refers
to the most economical use of resources,
more closely resembling what might be
called “effectiveness.” “Equity” is con-
cerned with protecting the rights of offi-
cers. “Economy” ensures the least
possible cost at all times. First one, then
another of these goals prevailed as the
Navy interacted with the administration
and Congress during its periodic expan-
sions and contractions. The interaction
between the Navy and Congress in ad-
dressing naval personnel problems repre-
sents a major portion of the historical
action recounted here. Of particular
value is the report on congressional naval
debates, offering not only the bills that
passed but the full flavor of the debates,
including the attempts (both successful
and not) to amend them and the argu-
ments presented. This gives us an idea of
not only what happened but also of what
might have been.
The title of the book is taken from the
memoirs of Rear Admiral Yates Stirling,
Jr.: “With all its faults, and there are
many, the Navy has accepted selection
because it brings officers to high ranks
young enough to be at their best. Promo-
tion by seniority, waiting for dead men’s
shoes, is a sad blow to efficiency, for it
stifles initiative and offers no incentive.”
Yet for well over a century, promotion by
seniority prevailed. It took until what
later came to be called the Line Personnel
Act of 1916 for the Navy to adopt “selec-
tion up” as the means for determining
who was to be promoted. Chisholm char-
acterizes this decision as “the pivotal
point in the navy’s history.” The com-
manders and captains selected in the
twenty years following the passage of the
act were to become the flag officers who
led the Navy in its greatest test, and finest
hours, during World War II.
The main features of naval personnel or-
ganization emerged slowly and
incrementally. Initially the Navy had only
two ranks, lieutenant and captain; flag
ranks were not established until the Civil
War. For many years naval officers’ pay
lagged well behind that of Army officers.
Advancement by seniority resulted in
painfully slow promotion, which resulted
in officers overage in grade. For half the
period covered in this book the Navy had
no means to retire officers. The principle
of selection up was adopted only after
trying a series of other ways to select for
promotion. These included the use of
professional examinations as a screening
device and the establishment of “pluck-
ing boards” to accomplish “selection
out.” None, however, proved satisfactory.
Even after accepting selection up, the
Navy still had to figure out how the selec-
tion board would work, what criteria
would be used, and the details of fitness
reports. So simple a matter as determin-
ing the number of officers needed in the
various grades took years to organize.
One of the great virtues of Chisholm’s
study is his detailed presentation of how
every problem was addressed, describing
the invariable false starts and unintended
consequences that led serendipitously to
a stronger institution. Chisholm argues
that organizations cannot rely upon a
succession of brilliant leaders: “It is that
their rules and procedures—not least
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those that govern the procurement, edu-
cation and training, advancement, and
placement of their personnel—permit
them to operate effectively with normal
human beings, and to withstand the oc-
casional individual who proves less than
completely competent.”
Gratitude is due to Stanford University
Press for publishing this valuable work,
which even at its steep price is unlikely to
return its costs. For a book that will prob-
ably be consulted a great deal, however, it
is too bad that a sturdier binding was not
used. My copy is already beginning to fall
apart.
Chisholm has achieved what he set out to
do in fine style. He has provided a com-
prehensive history of naval officer per-
sonnel management and at the same time
has shed light on the creation, structure,
and problem solving that resulted in the
organization we see today. From now on
it will be impossible to write usefully
about the history of personnel manage-
ment without reference to this book. It
promises to be a standard authority.
JAMES BARBER
Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired
Davidsonville, Maryland
Lehman, John. On Seas of Glory: Heroic Men, Great
Ships, and Epic Battles of the American Navy. New
York: Free Press, 2001. 436pp. $35
John Lehman, former secretary of the
Navy and author of Command of the Seas
(1988), has with this book produced a
masterful outline of “the grandeur of the
American naval tradition.” The truest ex-
amples of this “grandeur” are “best
found in its people, fighting sailors, tech-
nical innovators and inspiring leaders.”
From John Paul Jones and the Revolu-
tionary War to the six-hundred-ship fleet
of the Cold War, John Lehman brings us
a wonderful episodic view of the U.S.
Navy’s people and ships, and their collec-
tive contribution to the strength and
character of the nation they have served.
Using both primary and secondary
sources in the United States and England,
Lehman offers an exciting and message-
laden portrait of the American naval
tradition, a portrait that is “deliberately
selective and subjective.” In short, this
book is not a typical chronological narra-
tive history of the U.S. Navy but a stimu-
lating history of a highly adaptive
institution.
One of the most intriguing sections is the
story of Joshua Humphreys, the “premier
ship-builder” and “the most innovative
and revolutionary designer of the age of
sail.” Humphreys would design several
warships for the young republic, all of
them larger, faster, and more heavily
armed than similar vessels in England or
France. Collectively known today as the
“super frigates,” this group included such
storied vessels as Constitution, United
States, and President. Even Admiral
Horatio Nelson, the preeminent naval
leader of his day, is quoted by Lehman as
foreseeing “trouble for Britain in those
big frigates across the sea”; the trouble of
which Nelson warned came during the
War of 1812. Throughout, Lehman con-
tends that, contrary to the views of many
historians, privateering had a significant
impact on the outcome of both the
American Revolution and the War of
1812. He argues that “the battles of the
American Revolution were fought on land,
and independence was won at sea.” This
work does much to reinforce such a view.
From the end of the Civil War to the be-
ginning of the Spanish-American War, a
great deal of technological and strategic
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